The Taurus Mountains of Asia Minor were formed long ago by the collision of the European, African and Arabian tectonic plates. They climb out of the the quiet shores of Lake Eğirdir in the west like a youth emerging from a refreshing swim, and then stand up and run on a southeasterly course toward the Bay of Pamphylia on the southern coast. Here they have left only a narrow sliver of arable land as a gift to the brigands and pirates who would one day terrorize the shipping lanes of the Mediterranean from the isolated cove. From Pamphylia, the mountains have come to full stature and tightly hug the shoreline, their feet playing in the waves of the Mediterranean. They form an imposing and deadly barrier to any who might dare to approach them. As an indication of the relative speed of the colliding plates, the Taurus as viewed from Cyprus (shown above) appear almost as a towering cliff or as a cresting wave of rocks about to crash down upon the watery plain of the Mediterranean. Now nearing  Cilicia the rocky crags have briefly turned due east and then, as if losing interest in the sea, proceed northeasterly, leaving the plains of Cilicia as another gift to the pirates, situated as they were between the Taurus mountains of Asia Minor and the Amanus mountains of Syria.  Here at Cilicia the Taurus mountains become the Anti-Taurus, and continue on their course until they reach the southeastern shores of the Black Sea to be united with their sister range, the Pontic Mountains that have served in a similar capacity along the northern coast.

Arranged as a tectonic smirk across the face of the Anatolian peninsula, the Taurus range forms a natural boundary between Asia Major and Asia Minor, between Syria and Anatolia. This Tauric barrier has given pause both to kings and to explorers who have contemplated advancing beyond them in either direction. There are very few passes from which to choose when crossing the Taurus, and by far the most frequented route is via the Ciliciæ Pylæ—the Cilician Gates—since they provide the most direct access between Syria and Asia Minor. And yet these Cilician Gates were prohibitively narrow—the width of “a wagon-road”— and easily defended—”exceedingly steep and impracticable for an army to pass if there was anybody to oppose it” (Xenophon, Anabasis 1.2.21). When passages are so narrow, and options so few, it is no wonder that so many men have come to terms with the Taurus by accepting them as a boundary of their empire.

From the east, the mountain range marked the end of Assyrian and Babylonian imperial reach. Ancient inscriptions claim that the Sumerian god, Enlil, had given king Sargon the Great all the land to the west “as far as … the Silver Mountains,” a reference to the imposing Taurus range (Legends of Babylon and Egypt in Relation to Hebrew Tradition, The Schweich Lectures, Lecture I, 1916).

From the west, Byzantine Emperor Heraclius spent decades trying to maintain his territories in Syria and Palestine only to be dealt a humiliating loss at the Battle of Yarmouk in 636 A.D.. Unable to hold the territories, the Emperor finally withdrew his forces “back to the line of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus ranges” which finally formed the eastern frontier of the Byzantine Empire (John Haldon, Byzantium at War AD 600-1453. Essential Histories, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 39).

We make this cursory geological and political review of the history of the Taurus range to show that well before Alexander, and long since, the mountains have for millennia imposed themselves upon the administration of the region. We also review the history of the Taurus mountains because they factor critically into the period of post-Alexandrian Hellenism in Asia Minor, as well as the eventual rise of Rome as a world power. The mountains formed a natural boundary that was recognized by the Diadochi—Alexander’s successors—as they tussled for control of the remnants of his empire, and by Rome as it confronted the threatening expansionist posture of the Seleucids. What we shall discover is that the Taurus mountains were clearly the boundary between the northern and eastern kingdoms that succeeded Alexander. They served simultaneously as the eastern border of Lysimachus’ northern kingdom, and as the western boundary of Seleucus’ eastern kingdom. They continued serving in that capacity even after Seleucus defeated Lysimachus and conquered Asia Minor at Corupedium in 281 B.C..

We return now to the dark period of the Diodochi, a period that is obscured by the lack of a continuous narrative that captures the history of the transition from Alexandrian to post-Alexandrian Greece. As we noted last week, it was one of the most poorly documented periods in the history of Western Civilization, and yet that formative period was critical to the development of philosophy, religion and politics in the Western Hemisphere. It is also critical to our understanding of Danielic eschatology, as Daniel spends much of his time in chapters 7, 8 and 11 discussing the events related to the four-way division of Alexander’s empire. For the moment, we turn to general Lysimachus, king of Thrace and of his territories in Asia Minor. As we noted last week, Lysimachus occupied the northern territories of the post-Alexandrian Greek empire, and Seleucus occupied the eastern territories.

However, as with the rest of the period of the Diadochi, the boundary between Lysimachus’ territory and Seleucus’ territory is not clearly documented. We have suggestions and hints, but no explicit statements from which to reconstruct the common border between the northern and eastern kingdoms.

Edwyn Robert Bevan, in his exhaustive history of the house of Seleucus, writes that in the aftermath of the death of Antigonus at Ipsus (301 B.C.), Seleucus and Lysimachus gained the most, but the border between them is difficult to determine:

“It was Seleucus and Lysimachus who gained the most territory. Seleucus now annexed Syria, and Lysimachus a great part of the territory ruled by Antigonus in Asia Minor; where exactly the new frontier was drawn we cannot say. … The whole question of the partition after Ipsus is extremely obscure.” (Bevan, The House of Seleucus, vol 1, London: Edward Arnold (1902) 61, 323)

Adding to the obscurity of the division, the Roman historian Appian, writing more than four centuries after the events, records that after Ipsus, “all Syria from the Euphrates to the sea, also inland Phrygia, fell to the lot of Seleucus” (Appian, The History of Rome: the Syrian Wars, (55)). This statement from Appian has puzzled not a few historians, as it assigns to Seleucus not only Syria to the east of the Taurus, but also Phrygia in the heart of Asia Minor west of the Taurus after the critical battle. None of the Greek historians of record—Diodorus Siculus, Polybius, Plutarch—assign that territory to him. It is a division that is counterintuitive to say the least. After all, as a prelude to the battle, Lysimachus had already marched east and south across Asia minor and reduced Synnada, as well as “some of the strongholds that held the royal wealth” in southeast Phrygia. Meanwhile, his general, Prepelaüs, was reducing the western parts of Asia minor (Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 20.107.2-4). Essentially, Lysimachus already held major portions of Asia Minor, including inland Phrygia leading up to the battle. All this was taking place while Seleucus was still across the Taurus mountains in the “upper satrapies” of Media, Persia and Armenia (Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 20.108.5-109.5).

Then after the battle, as Polybius relates, the victors “decided that [the] whole of Syria should belong to Seleucus” (Polybius, Histories, Book 5.67.8), and as Diodorus relates, “in accordance with the terms of the agreement, [Seleucus] endeavoured to appropriate Coelê Syria” (Diodorus Siculus, Fragments of Book 21.1.5). After Ipsus, Plutarch describes Seleucus’ territories as “the whole domain from India to the Syrian sea” (Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 32.4). Neither Polybius, nor Diodorus, nor Plutarch say anything further about Seleucus’ spoils from Ipsus, except Diodorus’ report that Seleucus left forthwith from Ipsus with his army to arrange his new territories across the Taurus:

“As for Seleucus, after the partition of the kingdom of Antigonus, he took his army and went to Phoenicia, where, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, he endeavoured to appropriate Coelê Syria.” (Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 21.1.5)

It would be odd therefore for Lysimachus to offer up to Seleucus as the spoils of Ipsus the territories in Asia Minor that he had reduced prior to the defeat of Antigonus, indeed, before Seleucus had even crossed the Taurus to join the battle. It would be odder still for Seleucus to take “inland Phrygia” from Lysimachus in the negotiations and immediately depart with his army for Syria, as if “inland Phrygia” could somehow take care of itself while its new commander crossed the Taurus to arrange matters to the east.

We therefore join Bevan in his objection to Appian’s appropriation of “inland Phrygia” to Seleucus immediately following Ipsus. We agree that Seleucus would eventually acquire all of Asia Minor after the defeat of Lysimachus at Corupedium in 281 B.C., as we noted above. But that was 20 years later. Seleucus’ acquisitions at Ipsus included Syria; his acquisitions after Corupedium included Phrygia. Appian appears to have lumped them all together as the spoils of Ipsus alone. As Dutch historian Jona Lendering observes, “Appian’s chronology is a bit confused” in his description of events at this point (see Appian, The History of Rome: the Syrian Wars, (55), note 11). Bevan attributes Appian’s anachronism here to a “carelessness” that occasionally plagues his record:

“Appian seems there to write with more than usual carelessness, tumbling together the acquisitions of Seleucus before Ipsus, and his acquisitions after Ipsus without distinction. … if Seleucus at some later time occupied Phrygia (after the rupture with Lysimachus), Appian would be quite likely in his  loose way to bring it in here.” (Bevan, 323)

For this reason, Bevan simply  has Lysimachus’ territory stretching “from the Cilician Gates westward over the tableland of Asia Minor” and beyond into Europe (Bevan, 69), and Günther Hölbl describes Lysimachus’ spoils from Ipsus as “Anatolia as far as Taurus” (Hölbl, Günther, History of the Ptolemaic Empire (New York: Routledge, 2001) 22). The Taurus mountains had for centuries served as the boundary between kingdoms and empires. Given Roman Appian’s carelessness elsewhere, his casual appropriation of “inland Phrygia” to Seleucus after Ipsus has caused historians to defer to the Greek historians who do not see Asia minor in Seleucus’ hands until after Corupedium.

But there is another reason—apart from Appian’s carelessness—to assign to Lysimachus all of Asia Minor within the Taurus mountains. Plutarch, in explaining Demetrius’ last attempts to restore Antigonus’ former holdings to himself, has Demetrius invading Asia Minor from Macedonia, and even making some headway against Lysimachus’ men in the west. But then he is confronted by Lysimachus’ son, Agathocles, and facing him, Demetrius retires inland, having decided that he might fare better across the Taurus mountains in Armenia:

“But when Agathocles, the son of Lysimachus, came against him with an army, Demetrius retired into Phrygia; he had determined, if once he could reach Armenia, to bring Media to revolt and attempt the upper provinces, which afforded an ejected commander many refuges and retreats.” (Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 46.4)

From here, Demetrius is in retreat, making his way east across Asia Minor, Agathocles and his men, harrying him on the way, so that Demetrius “was shut off from getting provisions and forage, and was in great straits” (Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 46.4). His only option was to press forward beyond the Taurus, and Agathocles was only too happy to show him the door. Once beyond the Taurus, Agathocles and his men “fortified the passes of the Taurus against him” (Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 47.2), leaving Demetrius trapped in Cilicia, for Seleucus, too, had fortified the Amanus mountain passes into Syria (Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 47.2). This brief snapshot of history thus has three of the Diadochi—Lyismachus, Demetrius and Seleucus—tightly barricaded in their own territories: Lysimachus in Asia Minor within the Taurus, Seleucus with Syria barricaded against Demetrius, and Demetrius trapped in Cilicia, which he until then had refused either to give or to sell to Seleucus. 

The significance of this passing reference by Plutarch is that Lysimachus and his son, Agathocles, had acted very much like they possessed Asia Minor within the Taurus mountains—fortifying the passes of the Taurus against Demetrius—just as Seleucus was acting very much like he possessed Syria to the east of the Amanus mountains, fortifying his own passes against Demetrius as well. This behavior is consistent with the descriptions of our Greek historians who have Syria, rather than portions of Asia Minor, assigned to Seleucus after Ipsus, leaving Asia Minor within the Taurus to Lysimachus. As Bevan notes,  Agathocles’ actions against Demetrius within the Taurus are “improbable” if Seleucus was truly in possession of “inland Phrygia” as Appian claimed:

“[I]n 287 [B.C.] we find the armies of Lysimachus pursuing Demetrius as far as the passes of the Taurus and barricading the passes in his rear, a proceeding not indeed impossible, but improbable if the country north of the Taurus belonged at that time to Seleucus.” (Bevan, 323).

Given Roman Appian’s known carelessness and inaccuracy in his recreation of the events, and given the fact that the Greek historians do not assign Asia Minor to Seleucus after Ipsus, but rather have him departing immediately from Ipsus to his new possessions in Syria, and given the imposing natural barrier created by the Taurus mountains themselves, and given the fact that Lysimachus’ armies treated cis-Tauric Asia Minor as their own, we believe with other historians that Appian’s claim of “inland Phrygia” for Seleucus after Ipsus is an anachronism. An emergent testimony from the scanty historical record is strongly suggestive therefore of a northern kingdom within the Taurus mountains in Asia Minor. Soon thereafter, Seleucus takes Cilicia back from Demetrius, creating an eastern kingdom that stretched from the Taurus mountains to India.

As we would suspect, just as the Taurus Mountains have served as a natural boundary between empires before and since Alexander, they present themselves here as a natural boundary between the eastern and northern kingdoms of the Diadochi—a boundary that has no small significance to our understanding of Daniel 11 and the eschatology derived from the narrative recorded for us in that chapter by the prophet.

In closing, we simply note that the Taurus mountains served not only as an eastern boundary for Lysimachus’ territories in Asia Minor, but as suggested by the imposing barrier they form along the southern coast of Asia Minor (pictured above), they also served as his southern boundary, too. The fact that Lysimachus did not possess the southern coast of Asia Minor—but that another of the Diadochi actually did—will be of great significance as we proceed into Daniel chapter 11.